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Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reviving Disarmament

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on a topic vital to our national security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents the most serious threat to the United States and the international community. The threat, while not new, is growing, and taking on new and more complex and dangerous dimensions. Under President Bush's direction, the U.S. government has taken many steps to meet the evolving threat that we face.

Last week, I accompanied Secretary Bodman to Vienna to attend the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is celebrating its fiftieth anniversary. The IAEA was born out of the need to foster peaceful uses of the atom and guard against its diversion to weapons. Fifty years is a useful point to assess the international nonproliferation regime and the challenges that face it. The questions raised by the Subcommittee are important, and I welcome the opportunity with my colleagues from the Departments of State and Defense to address them.

There are not two nuclear energies: one peaceful and another for military use. Many of the materials and facilities needed to produce power are the same as those used with nuclear weapons. Managing this situation has been one of the great global challenges of the last fifty years, and remains one today.

The good news is that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has scored critical victories over its 35-year history. There are not twenty or thirty nuclear weapon states today as predicted in the 1960s. South Africa dismantled a nuclear weapons program and joined the NPT where it remains a party in good standing. Argentina and Brazil also joined the NPT after many years of pursuing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities outside of safeguards. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus chose to forego nuclear weapons left on their territories after the Soviet collapse; each acceded to the NPT, making the choice – the correct choice – to part with nuclear weapons under difficult circumstances. Most recently, Libya made the strategic decision to renounce its nuclear and other WMD programs and is now re-engaging with the international community.

Yet norms alone are not sufficient to prevent proliferation. Iran and North Korea are pursuing nuclear capabilities in violation of their nonproliferation and safeguards obligations. Clandestine nuclear trading networks, including those led by A.Q. Khan, aided these programs and dispersed sensitive nuclear technologies. After 9/11, meeting the danger of nuclear terrorism has also gained in primacy and urgency. Organizations and individuals with violent, subversive aims will seek the most violent, indiscriminate weapons to achieve those aims.

We also find countries criticizing the United States for failing to take meaningful steps towards disarmament. Some of these same states see in our Iran policy proof that we seek to inhibit peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I respectfully disagree. We are significantly reducing the U.S. stockpile from its heights during the Cold War, and have offered new policy proposals to secure the safe expansion of nuclear energy on a scale not seen in history.

Nuclear Reductions

In the area of nuclear reductions, our record is known and undeniably strong, but a few facts deserve repeating.

- The Department of Energy has dismantled more than 13,000 weapons since 1988.
- Under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, operationally deployed U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads will not exceed 1,700 to 2,200 each by December 31, 2012.
- In 2003, the Department of Energy completed dismantlement of most non-strategic nuclear weapons, limiting our stockpile of these systems to less than one-tenth of Cold War levels.
- Finally, in May 2004, President Bush approved a plan that will cut the U.S. stockpile by almost one-half from the 2001 level. By the end of 2012, the

Department of Energy's disarmament efforts will have reduced the stockpile to its smallest level in several decades.

In addition to weapons dismantlement, the Department of Energy is making tremendous progress to reduce and eliminate fissile material made surplus to defense requirements.

Again, a few points are worth mentioning:

- In 1994, the United States removed 174 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from defense stocks. As of July 2006, 92.2 metric tons of this total had been converted to low enriched uranium.
- The United States last year announced that 17.4 metric tons of excess HEU would be set aside to support fuel assurances for states that refrain from pursuing national enrichment and reprocessing programs and abide by international nonproliferation norms.
- In 2005, the Department withdrew an additional 200 metric tons of HEU, declaring that this material would no longer be available for use in nuclear weapons.

These are unilateral actions that contribute to nonproliferation and improve our security posture by eliminating proliferation-attractive materials. Our work in partnership with Russia and others to secure nuclear materials left over from the Cold War provides equally compelling evidence of the strong commitment of the United States to the NPT's goals. Let me offer a few highlights:

- We are eliminating 500 MT of Russian weapons HEU in a 20-year agreement through 2013. More than half of this material has been eliminated to date – enough for roughly 10,000 nuclear weapons;
- The United States and Russia committed to dispose of 68 metric tons of excess U.S. and Russian weapons-grade plutonium (34 metric tons each);
- We are accelerating by two years, to 2008, securing weapons-grade fissile materials in Russia. This includes HEU and weapons-grade plutonium in civilian facilities and military warhead storage sites; and
- We are helping Russia to close down its remaining three plutonium production reactors.

These are significant achievements.

Building On and Off of the Regime

The NPT does not address nuclear terrorism. “Terrorism” does not appear in the text of the NPT or in any IAEA safeguards agreement. Nuclear terrorism was not seen as a significant military danger at the time of the NPT’s drafting. Moreover, given that the NPT encourages peaceful civilian nuclear programs, proliferators have been able to acquire nuclear technology within the parameters of the Treaty and could use this technology for nuclear weapons purposes or as cover for their clandestine nuclear weapons programs. Clearly, actions are needed to prevent abuses of the NPT regime.

In his February 11, 2004 speech, President Bush warned against proliferators, such as Iran and North Korea, cynically manipulating the NPT to pursue nuclear weapons under the cover of peaceful programs. To address this problem, the President challenged the world's leading nuclear suppliers to ensure that states have reliable access at a reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states forego the most sensitive nuclear technologies – enrichment and reprocessing. The President also called on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to strengthen controls on enrichment and reprocessing technologies to ensure they do not spread beyond those states already having “full scale, fully functioning” enrichment and reprocessing plants.

We continue to work with our partners in the NSG to adopt new controls and policies for enrichment and reprocessing technologies, and to support other critical actions, such as endorsing the Additional Protocol as a new condition of supply.

President Bush’s comprehensive strategy to combat proliferation also includes new approaches beyond the NPT that address state and non-state proliferation, for example: the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to interdict trade in WMD materials and technologies to and from state and no-state actors of proliferation concern; UN Security Council resolution 1540, which requires states to adopt strict export controls with civil or criminal penalties, adopt and enforce laws to prohibit the manufacture, acquisition or transfer of WMD and establish controls to secure at-risk materials; and the recently announced Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The Global Initiative calls on all states concerned with the nuclear threat to international peace and security to make a

commitment, consistent with relevant international frameworks, to develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism and proliferation on a determined and systematic basis. We now have both the legal mandate and the international framework to take effective action to prevent proliferation. Additionally, many of the Department of Energy's own programs are already addressing the problem of nuclear terrorism, including the Second Line of Defense Program and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Working in close concert with our USG interagency counterparts and foreign partners under the framework of existing efforts, we will continue to build upon the "defense-in-depth" strategy to further reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Effective action implies both political will and capacity. Through our international safeguards, physical protection, export control and border security programs, the Department is providing technical expertise to assist our partners in building this capacity and the infrastructure to prevent proliferation. Our nonproliferation and nuclear security programs involve more than 70 countries – or more than a third of all UN members, and our budget to support these activities has more than doubled since 9/11.

In addition to strengthening national nonproliferation programs, we are updating international obligations and guidelines for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. In July 2005, an amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities (CPPNM) to broaden the scope to cover all civilian nuclear materials and facilities was adopted by diplomatic conference, and is now in the process of being ratified by states parties to the CPPNM. The amendment also included stronger provisions for criminal penalties and prevention of sabotage. In addition, we

plan to recommend updates to the international physical protection guidelines in IAEA INFCIRC/225. These guidelines must be adjusted to meet the evolving threat environment.

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

The Department's programs that build nonproliferation infrastructure contribute to a related goal – preparing conditions for the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy. In the coming decades, as electricity requirements to meet economic growth targets worldwide soar, nuclear energy is expected to make a substantial comeback. This conclusion is gaining increasing worldwide acceptance.

To enable the more widespread use of nuclear energy in ways that support nonproliferation, the United States has proposed the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership ... or GNEP. Through GNEP, we propose to establish the basis for greater international access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and a strengthened nonproliferation regime.

GNEP would seek to promote proliferation-resistant reactors designed to meet the needs of developing economies, utilizing advanced technologies that make it difficult to remove materials or modify facilities without detection by the IAEA or the host state.

The GNEP technologies will require further development, but we are very eager to build international support for the principles underlying GNEP and establish a fuel supply framework involving suppliers and recipients. As a first step, the United States is urging

IAEA endorsement of a concept for back-up supply put forward by six “enrichment” states – the U.S., France, the U.K., Germany, the Netherlands, and Russia. As noted, the United States has also set aside materials for a nuclear fuel reserve and we encourage others to join us, as Russia has proposed to do through the establishment of an international fuel service center at a Russian facility. Diversity in back-up supply mechanisms will promote confidence that supply disruptions, unrelated to nonproliferation violations, will be addressed quickly.

Through GNEP, our aim is to provide energy and security, using mechanisms that allow states to avoid the cost, safety, security, and safeguards burdens associated with long-term storage of spent fuel and uranium enrichment programs that serve no rational economic or energy purpose.

Looking to the Future

The last fifty years have seen amazing advancements in nuclear technology, as well as an alarming growth in interest by terrorists and rogue states in nuclear weapons. As we look ahead to the next fifty years, we will need to continue to strengthen our efforts to prevent proliferation, while also enabling the legitimate growth of nuclear power as a safe, clean, and secure energy alternative. GNEP plays an important role in achieving both objectives.

While great progress has been made to prevent proliferation, much more work remains to be done. The Department of Energy is committed to addressing the nonproliferation

challenges of our changing world, and we look forward to working with Congress and our international partners in accomplishing still more in the future.